Charlotte Hille
Associate professor of international law and international relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam. She worked at UNPO on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and at the Dutch Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, among others as a Caucasus specialist. Her dissertation was on Statebuilding in the Transcaucasus Since 1917, followed in 2010 by a monograph entitled State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus. Dr Charlotte Hille is a mediator and was visiting scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg Center, Harvard University, in Spring 2007.

Abstract: With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the UN, OSCE and EU decided to postpone indefinitely the peace-negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia, since the conflict might negatively affect the Geneva International Discussions, as the peace-process is called. However, the negotiations have been far longer in an impasse. It seems impossible to have a functioning Incidence Prevention and Response Mechanism, when no compromise can be reached on a non-use of violence declaration. All parties are worried about the militarisation of the region. Between 1992 and 2008 peace-negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia also turned repetitive, resulting in a frozen conflict. Is there a way out of this impasse?

Introduction

On 14 August 2022, it will be 30 years since fighting broke out between Georgian troops and Abkhazians in Abkhazia. It will be 30 years ago that I went to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Secretary-General of UNPO to ask the Ministry if the Netherlands could mediate in the conflict. A cease-fire was eventually signed on 3 October 1992, under the watchful eye of Russian President Boris Yeltsin.[1]

Peace-negotiations started in Geneva between the Georgian and the Abkhazian delegations. The UN Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for the Conflict, who shuttled between the parties when necessary, reported to the Secretary-General for the Security Council, and played a mediating role at the meetings in Geneva. For 16 years, talks took place with the UN acting as mediator.

In the period between 1992 and 2008, cease-fires were violated several times and renegotiated. The recurring breakdown-point was the status of Abkhazia, and the way in which Georgia could negotiate with Abkhazia without recognising it, while Abkhazia had problems with the impartiality of the UN, which had adopted resolutions underlining the territorial integrity of Georgia.

Peace-negotiations Between 1992 and 2008

State-building in Abkhazia

As a de facto independent state, Abkhazia strengthened itself when it adopted its own constitution, formulated in such a way that a solution to the conflict was textually possible both inside and outside of Georgia. This constitution was presented to the government in 1993, and after discussion in parliament and government, officially came into force on 24 November 1994, when President Ardzinba took the oath on the new constitution.[2] It is worth noting that this constitution was drafted earlier than the constitution of Georgia, which was not finalised until 1994 and came into force on 17 October 1995.[3]

After a declaration of sovereignty and a referendum on the question of acceptance of the constitution in 1999, the formal declaration of independence of Abkhazia followed on 12 November 1999, which made it more difficult to find a solution where all parties could be content.[4]

The situation changed again when, after the Five Day War between Georgia and the Russian Federation in August 2008, the Russian Federation recognised Abkhazia as a state de jure, changing the scope of negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia.

UN Involvement in the Conflict

A Declaration of Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict was adopted on 4 April 1994. The settlement included a Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, which was followed a month later by an agreement on a cease-fire and a separation of forces.[5] This document also included a protocol with regard to the stationing of CIS peacekeeping forces. Apart from CIS peacekeepers, the UN deployed UN military observers who would patrol the border-area, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).[6]

The UN Security Council has adopted many resolutions, urging the parties to refrain from hostilities, and observe the cease-fire agreements of 1993. The negotiations following the 1994 resolutions mainly dealt with the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia, in addition to seeking a resolution to the conflict.

Early in the conflict, in 1993, a Special Envoy of the Secretary General was appointed to brief the Secretary General and the Security Council on the developments in the relation between Georgia and Abkhazia. The Special Envoy also played a role as mediator in the negotiation-process. Negotiations involved, apart from the parties to the conflict, the Special Envoy of the Secretary General to the UN, representatives of the Russian Federation as facilitators, the OSCE, the Group of Friends of the Secretary General (consisting of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Russian Federation).[7]

These met in a Coordinating Council. The Coordinating Council was set up on 18 December 1997 in Sukhum(i) and Tbilisi and met regularly, alternating its meetings in Sukhum(i) and Tbilisi.[8] The Coordinating Council divided its work into Working Groups, in which two representatives for each of the parties participated, as well as the UN Special Envoy as chair, Russia as facilitator, the OSCE, and the Group of Friends as observers. Working Group I dealt with issues related to a lasting non-resumption of hostilities and to security-problems; Working Group II discussed the issue of refugees and internally displaced persons; Working Group III was responsible for finding a resolution for economic and social problems.[9] From 16 to 18 October 1998, as part of the ongoing negotiation-process that took place in Geneva, a meeting was convened in Athens to discuss confidence-building measures. In addition to the expected participants, the Georgian and Abkhazian delegations included academics, businessmen, cultural figures, journalists and representatives of NGOs, in order to create a broad support for the process.[10] This process took place while exchanging information on the decisions taken by the Coordinating Council.

The Secretary General presented a draft-protocol, indicating which measures should be taken as part of the confidence-building measures. Refugees and IDPs should have the right of voluntary return to the places of their permanent residence; violations of the cease-fire and separation-of-forces agreement  of 14 May 1994 should be investigated jointly by UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force; the prosecutors should be supported by both sides in investigating criminal cases; support for the leaders of the military structures of the conflicting parties for rapid response in the conflict-zone should be given; de-mining programmes should be promoted; contracts in the fields of energy, trade, agriculture, and construction should be promoted; there should be active involvement in the investigation of cases involving persons missing during the hostilities and the handing over of the remains of the dead; and lastly donor countries should support the carrying out of psychological-social rehabilitation of post-trauma syndrome.[11]

This initiative resulted in another important meeting concerning confidence-building measures in June 1999 when a proposal was adopted in Istanbul to renew efforts to solve the problem of the refugees and IDPs from Abkhazia. Another topic at this meeting was the economic situation.[12]

The UN Security Council regularly extended the mandate of UNOMIG, which in turn participated in confidence-building measures. Apart from UNOMIG, a CIS peacekeeping force was established in the border-zone between Georgia and Abkhazia from 1993.[13]

Frozen Conflict

The status as a ‘frozen conflict’ also resulted from the tactics of the negotiators. As time went on, the momentum for a breakthrough was lost. There were spoilers both in and outside the delegations. People willing to compromise were replaced by hardliners, there was sporadic fighting along the borders of the conflicting parties, and inflammatory rhetoric was used as another means of continuing the fight. As time went on, and new Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General were appointed to report on the situation and mediate, parties had to build confidence in the new mediator, and the willingness to work towards a compromise potentially diminished. Parties dug themselves in, and the peace-proposals were often reformulations of earlier versions, to which the other party could only say “no”.[14] Although protracted conflicts between the metropolitan state and the secessionist entity at some point may be called a ‘frozen conflict’, this may be misleading, since negotiations, sporadic fighting, and developments in international politics in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict continued.[15]

In the end, the conflicts over the status of Abkhazia were not only ‘frozen conflicts’, but worse, ‘forgotten conflicts’, with little international attention.[16] The fighting in August 2008 did two things: the conflict became violent, and it placed the ‘forgotten’ conflict back on the international political agenda, thus creating new possibilities to negotiate a settlement. The role of Russia in this process changed from facilitator, and as provider of military for the peace-keeping force, to a party to the conflict.[17]

The Situation Just After the 2008 Cease-Fire Agreement

French president Nicolas Sarkozy on 12 August 2008 brokered a cease-fire. From the beginning it was clear that both parties, the Russian Federation and Georgia, interpreted this document differently. The Russians insisted on not using the term ‘territorial integrity’ with regard to the Georgian territory. Another point for the Russians was the removal of Georgian President Saakashvili from office. The Georgian party interpreted the cease-fire as indicating that Georgia’s territorial integrity would be preserved.[18]

On 15 and 16 October 2008 a meeting hosted by the UN, OSCE and EU took place to discuss further the terms of the cease-fire agreement. Georgia stressed that it did not want Abkhazian delegates to be present, which can be regarded as a missed chance, since both Abkhazia and Russia considered it important that in order to come to a lasting solution of the conflict, the delegates of Abkhazia would also participate in the talks.[19]

During November 2008 a second round of negotiations started. The mediators found a way to incorporate the relevant parties in the process. Georgia allowed participation of delegations from the Abkhazian government and asked that delegations from the (Georgian) Abkhazian Government-in-exile also be present. Instead of official meetings, the different groups met informally in working groups.[20]

The topics that are of concern at the moment are also those at stake just after the 2008 cease-fire agreement. Georgia rebuilt its military with the support of the West, the USA and NATO, and Abkhazia worried about its safety and contained a Russian military base on its territory. The Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism was very much needed, and it was difficult to keep parties in the same room.

When in June 2010 the need of a commitment on the non-use of force was discussed, this led to such diverse positions that the talks ended in deadlock. The US considered that the 12 August 2008 ceasefire-agreement between Georgian President Saakashvili and Russian President Medvedev, mediated by French leader Sarkozy, “already establishes the sides’ commitment to the non-use of force”. The US considered regular meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism a good addition. Abkhazia and South Ossetia wanted more security-guarantees from Georgia. Their opinion was not taken into account, and subsequently they walked out of the hall. Russia considered the 12 August 2008 agreement not sufficient and wanted a non-aggression treaty between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Note that a treaty is signed between states, and though Russia had recognised Abkhazia as a state, this would force Georgia to do so as well. Subsequently, this option was not realistic.

Abkhazia walked out of the talks several times in 2009 and 2010, because the co-moderators consistently failed to facilitate the talks in a constructive and impartial manner. Obviously there was an issue with commitment that found its origin in the fact that the co-chairs seemed biased. The Abkhazians returned, but lowered the level of their participation.

We now should move to the question as to who has been negotiating with whom since 2008. What are the challenges of the multi-party negotiations and multi-party mediation-team? What conclusion can we draw from 30 years of negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia?

Who is Negotiating with Whom?

Since 2008 Abkhazia and Georgia have been negotiating with the Russian Federation and South Ossetia in a format that is called the Geneva International Discussions (GID). This name should take the angle out of the problem that Georgia has with Abkhazia and South Ossetia being present at the negotiations, since Georgia regards Abkhazia and South Ossetia as part of its territory and thus considers that it negotiates on their behalf in international negotiations. In international law, negotiating with a government of a territory that is not recognised does not result in a recognition of that territory, and so, in principle, there should not be a legal problem. However, from a political point there is a sensitivity.

According to Jaba [Dzhaba] Devdariani and Teona Giuashvili in their article Geneva International Discussions. Negotiating the Possible

”Georgia views the GID as a process of mediation with Russia, following the August 2008 war between the two countries. Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia consider the GID a part of the negotiations regarding the conflict between Georgia on the one hand, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other.”[21]

This different view on the process can easily lead to misunderstandings as who should move and who is responsible.

The mediating parties in this conflict are the UN, OSCE and EU. According to Devdariani and Giuashvili the EU – legally and institutionally – gravitates towards primarily mediating the Georgia-Russia conflict, while the UN and OSCE are more engaged in Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-South Ossetia dynamics, respectively.[22] This is a historical development, since the UN mediated in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the OSCE mediated in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, and the EU mediated in the 5 day war between Georgia and the Russian Federation. Joining efforts as mediators seemed a logical step, combining knowledge of the conflicts and underlining the importance of the international community to peace in the region.

A topic of concern is the fact that the mediating organisations can be manipulated by one or more states participating in the GID format. In the UN Security Council the Russian Federation and the US have veto power. A possible obstacle in the OSCE is the fact that decision making takes place by consensus. Since Georgia and Russia are participating in the OSCE, this can slow down the decision-making process.  

Replacement of Mediators

When analysing the reports on the negotiations in the Geneva format, it is striking that the mediators in this process in all three organisations, UN and EU have been replaced several times, and for the OSCE on a yearly basis.

Devdariani and Giuashvili explain why the OSCE mediators change regularly:

“CiO Special Representative is fully dedicated to mediation tasks, but in contrast with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the UN Team, the OSCE CiO engagement in the GID is limited to a calendar year – corresponding to the term of a participating State’s Chairmanship.”[23]

Thus for the OSCE the reason lies in the fact that the position of mediator is connected to the chairmanship of the OSCE, which changes yearly. A mediator should gain the trust of the parties in order to be accepted and be effective. If a mediator changes regularly, and this also happened in the EU and UN mediation-team, this affects the trust that parties may have in the mediator and the process. Each time a change in the teams or mediators occurs, commitment has to be developed and restored again. For the parties, of which the negotiators have also changed in this period due to changes of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and their aides, the building of trust between mediators and negotiators from the other party can be difficult, which undoubtedly may have been a factor in slowing down of results due to a lack of mutual trust.[24] Given the fact that the negotiations take so long, this is logical but increases the risk that the conflict becomes and remains frozen.[25]

Peace-negotiations and the Conflict in Ukraine

Since March 2022 the Geneva International Discussions have been postponed indefinitely pending the war between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. This was done on the initiative of the three co-chairs of the UN, OSCE and EU. The reason for this step is the fear of the co-mediators that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will negatively affect the discussions.

However, continuation of negotiations in this format is the more important, since the International Geneva Discussions are the only format in which the security in the Caucasus is discussed.[26]

After the indefinite postponement of the talks, the co-chairs held bilateral talks with parties. On 31 May 2022 Irakli Tuzhba, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, declared in a conversation with the co-chairs that he is willing to continue discussions within the Geneva format. Three weeks later a statement was issued that Russia wanted the discussions to be moved to a neutral state, away from Geneva, at the headquarters of the UN. According to Russia, the negative attitude of the USA, the EU, OSCE and Switzerland stand in the way of constructive negotiations.

Russia underlined the need to sign a legally binding document on the non-use of violence against Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia.[27] Georgia also wants to sign a non-use of violence document, after Russia has withdrawn its troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which means that there seems little room for compromise.

In the next section we shall look at the security-issues that are discussed, and why they were and are in deadlock.

Pre-pandemic Negotiations

The question may be raised whether the negotiations before the lockdown went any better. In June 2018 the Abkhazian delegates state that they wish for more effectiveness in the Geneva International Discussions, of which a clearly formulated agenda is one step, as well as favourable conditions for dialogue. According to an Abkhazian statement, the Georgian delegation avoids a direct dialogue with the Abkhazians, and concentrates on its conflict with Russia. The Abkhazian delegation complains that Georgia is supporting resolutions in the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe that contain accusations against Abkhazia, while Abkhazia has no voice in these organisations, nor has it voting power. Impartial language is also an issue for the Abkhazian delegation, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Daur Kove called on the co-chairs of the Geneva Discussions to take a more responsible attitude to the formulations and abbreviations that they use to formulate the reports. "There is no administrative border along the Ingur River. There is a state border".[28] This shows once again how little scope for manoeuvre there is in the talks.

In March 2018 the atmosphere during the discussions had also been rather tense, and the same topics and statements are made as before and after, as we can see in the following summary of outcomes:

“The main requirement of the Abkhaz side at the 43-rd round of the Geneva discussions was still the adoption of a joint oral statement on the parties' commitment to the non-use of force which would serve as an important step towards signing a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia and Abkhazia and Georgia and South Ossetia. However, the oral statement of the parties was never accepted because this time the American formulation was unacceptable returning the old theses about the nature of events in August 2008.

“In turn, the representatives of the Georgian delegation tried to shift the discussion of the main issue by putting the case of the death of the Georgian citizen A.Tatunashvili at the center of the discussion accusing him of not only South Ossetia, but also Russia[29]. And they also continued to insist in their rhetoric that Abkhazia is an ‘occupied territory’ and is not a party to the conflict and Russia should take the responsibility for the non-use of force.”[30]

The concern that Abkhazia does not have the possibility to address international fora at the UN, EU, Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO and OSCE and therefore present its position was again raised in June 2017. Abkhazia also announced concerns about the cooperation between Georgia and NATO.[31]

Earlier during the negotiations, in October 2016 and March 2017 the Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Russian delegates left the meeting because the needs of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were not taken into account.[32]

Negotiations During Pandemic and Lockdown

On 10 and 11 December 2020 discussions were resumed after a one-year break due to COVID. The Georgian delegation was very concerned about a programme on the creation of a common socio-economic space between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia, fearing that this would result in a gradual integration of Abkhazia into the Russian space, as we shall see later… Earlier, the Georgian delegation was especially concerned about a meeting between the Russian and Abkhazian presidents held in Sochi on 12 November 2020, calling it a step in the direction of formal annexation. The Georgian delegation was worried that this is part of Russia’s policy of forcibly changing sovereign borders in Europe in contravention of international law.[33]   

Another worry of the Georgian delegation was the Russification of the population in Abkhazia, and the Georgian delegation underlined the need for education in the native language, in this case Georgian for the ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia. The importance of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism was also underlined by the Georgian side.

In 2021 one of the issues on the agenda was the need to make the negotiation-process more efficient, since to everyone it was clear that several issues on the agenda were in deadlock.

On 3 March 2021, during talks in the Geneva format Irakli Tuzhba, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia, said that “the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry has been regularly issuing statements urging the international community to take measures to prevent militarisation of the region. At the same time, the appeals of the Abkhazian side remain unanswered by representatives of international structures”.[34] Notwithstanding the EU policy of ‘engagement without recognition’, it seems that some parties are better heard than others.

During the 52nd round of the Geneva International Discussions that same month (March 2021) the co-chairs, UN, EU and OSCE, as well as participants from Georgia, Russia and the US, members of the exiled Georgian administrations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia met in their personal capacities, as a report of the meeting states. [35] The question that this raises is, if the parties to these discussions are not representing their constituents and governments, how can they validly sign any agreement at the end of the day? Doesn’t this in itself undermine the whole negotiation-process, even if it is called a ‘discussion’? 

Topics of Discussion

For years the negotiations on security-issues have been in deadlock. One of the topics on which the parties are not able to agree was a declaration on the non-use of force. The Abkhazian side complained that the Georgian side did not want to sign a document on international guarantees of the non-use of force. The Abkhazian side was willing to sign such a document, but the Georgians first wanted guarantees from Russia that they will not use force against Georgia before deciding on signing. A draft-document from the Georgians with support of the US in 2018 was unacceptable for the Abkhazian delegation, since it referred to the situation in 2008 where the Abkhazian and South Ossetian delegations were not accepted as formal parties to the conflict.[36]

On 19 and 20 June 2021, the US issued a statement during the 53rd round of the Geneva International Discussions, underlining that they want “withdrawal of Russian troops to pre-conflict positions as a key step towards full resolution of the conflict. The United States also underscored the importance of providing full access to conflict-affected areas for humanitarian organisations, in order to improve the lives of conflict-affected people.”[37] This shows one of the issues on which parties do not get any closer, since the Russians are not willing to remove their military base in Abkhazia, nor do the Abkhazians feel safe enough without military protection from Russia, and the Abkhazians do not allow the EU Monitoring Mission access to Abkhazian territory.

The OSCE Ministerial Council meeting and the Group of Friends of Georgia on 4 December 2020 issued a joint-statement, which did not take into account the position of the Abkhazian side. The Abkhazian delegation to the Geneva Discussions complained that they are not heard, and that this discredits ‘the very idea of an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’.[38] The statement led for Abkhazia to a breach of confidence in the Geneva International Discussions and the OSCE as co-chair:

“The Abkhazian side never had confidence in this regional structure and during the previous negotiation-process between Georgia and Abkhazia, which lasted from 1993 to 2008, the Abkhazian side categorically opposed the participation of OSCE representatives in it, as a result of which it was held under the auspices of the UN.”[39]

This breach in confidence should be remedied before discussions can continue. The Abkhazian side complains that it is denied the opportunity to speak at international venues, which adds to the one-sidedness of the information. The Abkhazian delegation stated:

“At this stage, it can be stated that the OSCE has completely exhausted its confidence in itself as an objective mediator in the negotiation-process and has become an accomplice in the policy pursued by Georgia. Taking into account the current situation, the Abkhazian side reserves the right to demand the exclusion of OSCE representatives from the Co-Chairs of the international Geneva Discussions on Stability and Security in Transcaucasia.

“In the event that the OSCE representatives change their extremely tendentious attitude towards the problem of resolving the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and provide the representatives of Abkhazia with an opportunity to speak within the framework of the activities of the relevant OSCE committees, this measure will allow revising the approaches of the Abkhazian side to the activities of this organisation.”[40]

Previously, Abkhazia had already stated in press-communiqués that Georgia in UN organs complains about Abkhazia, while Abkhazia, not represented and not having the right to raise its voice in these organisations, cannot defend itself and correct information. This has, as we saw above, resulted in the Abkhazian side claiming that the three co-chairs are not so impartial, and therefore, the co-chairs will have to do their utmost to gain the trust of the Abkhazian side and strengthen the commitment for the Abkhazians in this (for them) asymmetrical process.

Another topic that has been in deadlock for years is the unblocking of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in the city of Gal(i). The Abkhazian side considers that the Georgian delegation is unwilling to negotiate, while the Georgian delegation demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia as a precondition. Therefore, no movement has been visible in this respect.

The question whether the situation in the border-region of Abkhazia is stable is another topic of disagreement. While the co-chairs, Russia and Abkhazia consider the situation stable, Georgia does not agree on this, again referring to the Russian troops that are stationed in Abkhazia and agreements between Abkhazia and Russia that increasingly intertwine the economies of both republics.[41]

Finally, the Abkhazian delegation has been complaining that Georgia is receiving military aid and training from NATO and that a NATO facility is built in the city of Poti, not far from the Abkhazian border. This fuels fears that Georgia might consider using force against Abkhazia, if talks would close down. A similar development already emerged in 2020 in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh. The Georgian delegation is concerned about the Russian military base on Abkhazian territory and increasing military support for Abkhazia from Russia. The Abkhazian spokesman states that as long as Georgia wants to join NATO and is improving its military, the Abkhazian government has no other choice.[42] 

The Effect of the 2008 and 2014 Agreement On the Relation Between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation

In 2008 the Russian Federation signed a “Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” agreement with Abkhazia. The agreement included border-protection, and customs-, military and security- cooperation, but also topics like education and health.[43] In September 2014 this was followed by an agreement between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation on an “Alliance and Strategic Partnership”.[44]

Many Abkhazian citizens acquired Russian citizenship next to their Abkhazian citizenship, which brings with it the possibility of obtaining a Russian pension. Russia is (with 90%) the main beneficiary of Abkhazian exports, while Abkhazia imports mainly from Russia.[45] Since 99% of foreign investment comes from Russia, the Abkhazian government has adopted legislation to make it more difficult to buy Abkhazian property with Russian investments in order to avoid the Russian Federation becoming too dominant in the Abkhazian economy.[46]

The 2014 agreement provides detailed provisions on security-matters, according to Ambriosio and Lange. The document includes a commitment to “cooperate closely with each other in the [mutual] protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and security”.[47] Both parties agree to come to each other’s help in case of a threat to peace or breakdown of peace in order to guarantee a joint-defence, peace and mutual security. Russia has the right to base its armed forces in Abkhazia in order to be able to guarantee this, based on a subsequent treaty.[48] Article 10 of the agreement guarantees that parties may protect the rights of its citizens in the territory in accordance with general principles of international law.[49] Since most Abkhazians also hold Russian citizenship, this means that the Russian Federation reserves the right to intervene in Abkhazia, which reminds us of the situation in South Ossetia in August 2008.

Russia takes responsibility for “the maintenance and functioning of the financial and banking system” in Abkhazia, while legislation on economic activity, civil and tax law, social protection and pensions is unified in line with article 15 of the 2014 agreement.[50] The worries about a creeping annexation are therefore grounded.

Is there a way out of this deadlock? Can the theory of normalisation play a role?

Normalisation

In 2012 Russia and Georgia normalised their relations when bilateral trade and travel resumed. Normalisation is aimed at bringing progress in practical matters that are not related to the core question of the conflict. On  the topic of the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there are no moves. Abkhazia, according to the International Crisis Group, comes closer and closer in the sphere of influence to Russia. The International Crisis Group states: “The de facto governments’ relations with Russia are so close that they both have former Russian officials serving in senior roles, particularly at ministries responsible for security.”[51]

Russia and Georgia decided to appoint envoys who would meet in person and talk by telephone. Those appointed knew each other well, having been former colleagues in the Soviet administration. These were the first steps in confidence-building measures. Where normalisation led to developments in mutual cooperation in certain sectors, the Geneva discussions very soon became repetitive, and therefore stalled the process on solving issues related to the 2008 conflict. The bottom line is that Georgia has problems with Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which violates international law, and worries about the stationing of Russian troops in these republics. Russia has little incentive to make bigger moves, according to the International Crisis Group, since it has a military presence in these republics, and strengthens ties with the republics.[52]

The Georgian delegation wants an end to the limitations that Abkhazia has installed on the movement of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), and secondly, Georgia wants guarantees that Russia will not use violence against Georgia. Russia takes the stand that, since it has recognised Abkhazia, the EUMM should not cross an international border. With regard to the guarantee on non-use of violence, Russia states that in the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, it is a mediator, and not a party. This may be what it is, but in the Geneva discussions the outcome of the 5-day war and its cease-fire between Georgia and Russia is discussed with the support of the co-chairs UN, OSCE and EU, and in that sense Russia is definitely a party. With its military presence in Abkhazia, the Russian Federation does not have to worry that Georgia will soon become a member of NATO, since a state with a conflict on its territory cannot join NATO. The risk of escalation and the activation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty (an attack on one is an attack on all) frustrates this, especially if the potential conflict-party is the Russian Federation. Accession-discussions to the EU will also take many years.[53]  

Within the Geneva Discussions the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) has been developed to contact the other party when tension is rising in certain areas in order to avoid an outbreak of violence. This system has not been used since 2017, after an Abkhazian lower-rank officer killed a Georgian, and in South Ossetia it has not been used since 2019, when Georgia built a military outpost close to the border in order to avoid the South Ossetian border being moved further into Georgian territory. Although in 2020 contact resumed, the problems concerning these matters have not been solved.    

According to the International Crisis Group the normalisation-process could be a way out of the deadlock in the Geneva International Dialogue, because it gives even Georgia and Abkhazia the opportunity to intensify trade, without recognition and without considering the status of Abkhazia.[54]

Since the negotiations on the bigger issues have been deadlocked for more than a decade, the parties tend to concentrate on smaller projects that may provide results. As Devdariani and Giuashvili state: “Precisely since the talks about ‘overall objectives’ are effectively deadlocked, the GID participants are tempted to use technical projects to (re)assert the notions of statehood, identity and sovereign control.”[55]

Conclusion

The negotiations between Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia went into deadlock very soon after the talks started in 2008, because the issue of status cannot be addressed, and a lack of mutual confidence leading to militarisation of the region.

The militarisation in the South Caucasus region in combination with the lack of confidence and the lack of communication makes the cease-fire agreement vulnerable. It is very surprising that from the start all parties wanted something different and that a strong mediation-team formed of UN, OSCE and EU is not capable of addressing the issue of trust and the common need of peace in the region.

Is the situation between 2008 and 2022 different from the period of negotiations between 1992 and 2008? Not that much – cease-fire agreements were violated and signed, and Russia was present in Abkhazia as guarantor of the peace, with a military base and, until 2008, in the capacity of a UN peacekeeping force. Abkhazia developed its state-structure, declared unilateral independence, and sought recognition. In the meantime, it became more dependent on Russia as guarantor for safety and main trading partner. In the past years the peace-process has been in lockdown – or frozen, if you prefer – but actually, given the lack of mutual trust, this has been the case for the past 30 years. The only point of light may be the normalisation-process which provides chances to trade and discuss all matters not related to refugees and status.

___________________________

[1] Part of the text on the peace-negotiations between 1992 and 2008 is based on, and was published earlier in, C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden.

[2] C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden, p. 230.

[3] C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden, p. 246-247.

[4] C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden, p. 230.

[5] C.M.L. Hille, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, 2010, Leiden, p. 232, Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz Conflict signed on 4 April 1994, in S/1994/379, Annex I and Quadriparite Agreement in Annex II of the said document. The Agreement on a Cease Fire and Separation of Forces of 14 May 1994 in S/1994/583, 17 May 1994.

[6] The number of UNOMIG observers was expanded pursuant UN Security Council Resolution 937 (21 July 1994).

[7] The aim of the Group of Friends of the Secretary General was to create a favourable situation for conflict-transformation and confidence-building measures.

[8] https://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext8.php, accessed 19 April 2009.

[9] Ibid.

[10] https://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext8.php, accessed 19 April 2009.

[11] Ibid.

[12] https://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext8.php, accessed 19 April 2009.

[13] S/1994/583, 17 May 1994, and S/RES.937 (1994), 21 July 1994, where the mandate of UNOMIG was expanded, including overseeing the activities of the CIS peacekeeping forces as well.

[14] Chester Crocker et al explain in Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), how conflicts become intractable (a feature which applies to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict).

[15] SC/6671, 7 May 1999.

[16] Crocker, C., Hampson, F.O., Aal, P. (eds), Intractable Conflicts, Mediating in the Hardest Cases, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 2004, describe various forms of forgotten conflicts. In casu the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict could fall in the sub category ‘neglected conflicts’, p. 49-52.

[17] https://www.circassianworld.com/croniclewar.html, accessed 31 March 2009 and Crocker, C., ibid.

[18] C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden, p. 236.

[19] https://www.rferl.org/content/Talks_Betwen_Moscow_And_Tbilisi_Break_Down/13300183.html, accessed 15 October 2008.

[20] C.M.L. Hille, 2010, State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus, Brill, Leiden, p. 237.

[21] Jaba Devdariani, Teona Giuashvili, “Geneva International Discussions. Negotiating the Possible”, in Security and Human Rights, volume 26, 2016, p. 387. GID stands for Geneva International Discussions.

[22] Jaba Devdariani, Teona Giuashvili, “Geneva International Discussions. Negotiating the Possible”, in Security and Human Rights, volume 26, 2016, p. 387.

[23] Jaba Devdariani, Teona Giuashvili, “Geneva International Discussions. Negotiating the Possible”, in Security and Human Rights, volume 26 No 2016, p. 389.

[24] More on trust and commitment in C.M.L. Hille, B.E.E. van Sytzama, Introductie (Internationale) Medation, Voor iedereen die mediation wil begrijpen en toepassen, Boom Bestuurskunde, 2019, Amsterdam, pp. 40.

[25] More on frozen conflict in C.A. Crocker, F.O. Hampson, P. Aall, 2004, Taming Intractable Conflicts. Mediation in the Hardest Cases, Washington DC, US Institute of Peace.

[26] 31 May 2022, “During the conversation, the Abkhaz side expressed its readiness to continue working in the format of the International Geneva Discussions, which are the only international platform in which security issues in the South Caucasus are discussed”, On the Meeting with the Co-chairs of the International Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-vstreche-s-sopredsedatelyami-mezhdunarodnykh-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[27] On the Meeting with the Co-chairs of the International Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-vstreche-s-sopredsedatelyami-mezhdunarodnykh-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[28] On the 43rd Round of Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-43-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022, On the 45th Round of the Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-45-m-raunde-zhenvskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022

[29] This is indeed the text from the MFA’s website, but there is clearly an error. It should surely read: ‘…accusing not only South Ossetia but also Russia of it’ [Ed.].

[30] On the 43rd round of the Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-43-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.   

[31] On the 40th Round of the Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-40-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[32] On the 37th Round of the Geneva Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-37-om-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[33] Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 51st Round of the Geneva International Discussions, https://mfa.gov.ge/News/%E2%80%8Bsagareo-saqmeta-saministros-ganckhadeba-jenev-(3).aspx?CattID=5&lang=en-US, accessed 29 July 2022.

[34] “Irakli Tuzhba held a meeting with the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva International Discussions on Security and Stability in the Transcaucasia”, in http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/irakliy-tuzhba-provel-vstrechu-s-sopredsedatelyami-mezhdunarodnykh-zhenevskikh-diskussiy-po-bezopasn/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[35] “The GIDs are co-chaired by representatives of OSCE, EU, and UN, and involve participants from Georgia, Russia, and the U.S., as well as members of both the exiled Georgian administrations of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and the two regions’ Russian-backed authorities, in their personal capacities. Sessions are held in two working groups, with the first group discussing peace and security matters, and the second – humanitarian concerns.” 52nd round of the International Geneva Discussions on Security and Stability in the Transcaucasus, in http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-52-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-mezhdunarodnykh-diskussiy-/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[36] September 17, 2020, On the Meeting of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-vstreche-s-sopredsedatelyami-zhenevskikh-mezhdunarodnykh-diskussiy/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[37] Press Statement On the 53rd round of the Geneva Discussions,  http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-53-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy-/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[38] December 4, 2020, Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia on the Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia at the OSCE, in http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/kommentariy-mid-abkhazii-v-svyazi-s-zayavleniem-gruppy-druzey-gruzii-v-obse/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[39] Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia on the Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia at the OSCE, in http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/kommentariy-mid-abkhazii-v-svyazi-s-zayavleniem-gruppy-druzey-gruzii-v-obse/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[40] Commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia on the Statement of the Group of Friends of Georgia at the OSCE, in http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/kommentariy-mid-abkhazii-v-svyazi-s-zayavleniem-gruppy-druzey-gruzii-v-obse/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[41] Inter alia in 52nd round of the International Geneva Discussions on Security and Stability in the Transcaucasus, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-52-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-mezhdunarodnykh-diskussiy-/, accessed 29 July 2022.

[42] Inter alia in Press Statement On the 53rd round of the Geneva Discussions,  http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-53-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-diskussiy-/, accessed 29 July 2022, 52nd round of the International Geneva Discussions on Security and Stability in the Transcaucasus, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/news/geneva-discussions/o-52-m-raunde-zhenevskikh-mezhdunarodnykh-diskussiy-/, accessed 29 July 2022, 

[43] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 674.

[44] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 674.

[45] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 677 and International Crisis Group, “Abkhazia, Deepening Dependence”, Europe Report, #202, 2010, 6-7.

[46] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 677-678, T. German, 2012, “Security the South Caucasus: Military Aspects of Russian Policy Towards the Region Since 2008”, Europe-Asia Studies, 64(9), p. 1657.

[47] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 679.

[48] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 679-680.

[49] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 680.

[50] Thomas Ambrosio, William Lange, “The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bilateral Agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia”, in Nationalities Papers 2016, Vol. 44, No. 5, p. 680.

[51] International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia, Why and How to Save Normalisation, Briefing No. 90, 26 October 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/b90-georgia-and-russia-why-and-how-save-normalisation, accessed 29 July 2022.

[52] International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia, Why and How to Save Normalisation, Briefing No. 90, 26 October 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/b90-georgia-and-russia-why-and-how-save-normalisation, accessed 29 July 2022.

[53] International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia, Why and How to Save Normalisation, Briefing No. 90, 26 October 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/b90-georgia-and-russia-why-and-how-save-normalisation, accessed 29 July 2022.

[54] International Crisis Group, Georgia and Russia, Why and How to Save Normalisation, Briefing No. 90, 26 October 2020, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/b90-georgia-and-russia-why-and-how-save-normalisation, accessed 29 July 2022.

[55] Jaba Devdariani, Teona Giuashvili, “Geneva International Discussions. Negotiating the Possible”, in Security and Human Rights, volume 26, 2016, p. 391.